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 After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, there are a variety of perspectives in both 
positive and negative about family businesses related to corporate governance issues such as 
ownership concentration and control. Since the family firms have still play a significant role 
in driving Thai economy until now, the major objective of this study is to identify the 
relationship between founding-family firms and the firm performance.  Using firm-level data 
of 362 public companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2010 to 2014, we 
investigate whether family firms could generate better operation performance and market 
valuation with  a two-way fixed effects panel model. Our findings show that the firm 
performance of family firms is superior to non-family firms, in terms of profitability-based 
measures, such as return on asset. This effect is stronger for young family firms managed by 
the outside professional CEO. In contrast, family firms are not significantly related to the 
market-based measures, such as Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we find that the association 
between family ownership and firm performance is nonlinear. The positive relationship only 
exists when the concentrated ownership is at a low level, and the firm performance starts to 
deteriorate when the family shares exceed half of the firm’s total equity. Our research 
provides some evidence to the argument that family firms perform better than non-family 
firms, as a benefit from less principal-agency problem. However, such advantage requires a 
balanced family ownership and firm control.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Due to the fast-growing economies in the globalization trade, the competition and the 
challenge in doing business are more severe and difficult for the survival of such firm. The 
corporate structure is one of the concerned issues whether the ownership should be dispersed 
or concentrated. In the sense of modern trading with more investors’ protection and more 
available in the information, the dispersed ownership and control in the hands of management 
seems to be a general form (Berle and Means, 1932). As supported by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), millions of investors invest their wealth in the publicly listed firms and trust on the 
corporate management.  
On the contrary, La Porta et al. (1999) document the concentrated ownership 
apparently prevails in most countries except in the countries with strong minority 
shareholders’ protection. The ownership structure recognized in the listed stock market in 
many studies also appears in the form of family control not only in the developing countries 
but also in the developed countries. Anderson and Reeb (2003) present that family firms 
account for one-third of the S&P 500 in the US and Hadjielias et al. (2015) also collect the 
same portion in the UK listed market whereas Faccio and Lang (2002) show 44% of firms are 
family controlled in the Western European countries. It is more obvious in East Asia for 
concentrated ownership which is more than two-third of the firms held by a single 
shareholder (Claessens et al., 2000). The Economist (18 Apr. 2015) reported family firms are 
far from declining and will remain an important feature of global capitalism for the future 
since they provided two of the most important ingredients of growth, trust and loyalty. 
One of the concerns in family firms’ studies is agency theory (principal-agent 
problem). Although some studies believe that family firms are a solution for the conflict 
between the owner and the manager, they can also bring about another conflict between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Faccio et al. (2001) conclude that Asian firms 
pay out less of their earnings as dividends compared to European firms; therefore, controlling 
shareholders in Asian firms seem to expropriate more wealth from minority shareholders. As 
seen in many supported researches about the roots of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, 
Driffield et al. (2007) point out the failure of corporate governance in terms of the 














between voting and cash flow rights may be the reason. Claessens et al. (2000) find that the 
level of ownership concentration may diminish by the level of countries’ development. 
Therefore, the form of ownership structure in each country may be different based on how 
strong the legal and corporate governance is. Many academic papers try to fill up the gap 
about the appropriate ownership structure in today’s business whether family firms are 
beneficial to the firm performance or not. 
We focus our research on Thailand for several reasons. First, Thailand is one of the 
most seriously affected countries in the Asian Crisis in 1997. It is criticized for the poor 
corporate governance with the ownership concentration. Suehiro and Wailerdsak (2004) 
document that some of the dominant family firms left the market due to the financial and 
economic crisis in 1997. For example, the Tejapaibul family which is the leading Chinese-
Thai family in Thailand owned the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank Group, and the Wanglee 
family owned the Nakornthon Bank Group. Nevertheless, some family firms can survive and 
prosper until now, for instance, Lamsam family still has controlled over the Thai Farmers 
Bank. It is interesting why some family firms can pass their wealth from generations to 
generations and why some cannot. Second, Thai family firms’ information are available and 
obvious. The concentration of ownership is limited in the hands of few leading families. 
Many influential family businesses have pyramidal ownership structure controlling over the 
network of many sub-companies. Finally, Thai family firms can be a good proxy for Asian 
countries’ cultures which depend on the patron-client system. Bertrand et al. (2008) 
document that the manufacturing sector in the country expanded drastically after the first 
launch of the National Economic Development Plan in 1961; however, it is limited to a few 
groups of families that have connections with the banking sector and the government.  
Although there are many of previous researches studying about the ownership 
structure after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, with my best knowledge there is no any 
paper specifically focusing on individual family firms’ performance in Thailand by using 
both accounting and market measures. Suehiro and Wailerdsak (2004) performed the research 
in the aspects of qualitative view to gain an understanding of the corporate management and 
governance restructuring through the Financial Crisis period. Junhom (2011) studied the 
relationship in terms of the earnings quality of family-owned and managed firms which is 














This research contributes to the literature by considering the relationship between 
founding family firms and the firm performance with the samples of the listed companies in 
Thailand to find out whether family firms are superior to non-family firms. However, “family 
firm” is defined differently in various literatures. Our paper relies on the definition proposed 
by Anderson and Reeb (2003) as it was cited in many corporate and finance journals. They 
use the fractional equity ownership of the founding family and (or) the presence of family 
members on the board of directors to identify family firms. 
In addition, we further investigate the effect of family firms’ age and family control in 
management (CEO position) on the firm performance. This research would help us gain more 
understanding about appropriate ownership structure and the effect of family firms on the 
firm value. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Since family firms have their unique characteristics compared to other kinds of 
blockholders’ firms, it motivates researchers to find an answer to support the widespread of 
family ownership not only in developing countries but also in industrialized countries. 
Although there are abundant of family firm’s studies, their outcomes are still inconclusive.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) find that without separation between ownership and control, 
large shareholders tend to extract the benefits for their own. As a result in the complex 
corporations the separation between decision management and decision control can limit the 
agents to expropriate interests from the minority shareholders. They cite that the benefits of 
this separation are matter for the firms’ survival because the management has professional 
skill in decision making and it also helps reducing the agency costs within the residuals 
claimants.  
Corporate governance plays a significant role in helping investors to get their money 
back from the investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). They believe the concentrated 
ownership is an easy way to solve the conflicts between cash flow and control rights. 
Nevertheless, large shareholdings need to be complementary with strong legal protection to 
support an effective corporate governance system to satisfy both large and minority 














percentages of firm ownership, the shareholders have voting right to put pressure on the 
management performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
In order to find the evidence of the family control over the expropriation of minority 
shareholders, many researchers study on the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance. Due to the differences in the definition of family firms, the dummy variable is 
used to represent the family firm instead of family ownership in the regression. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) are one of the well-known papers that refute the negative perception in family 
ownership and control in public U.S. firms. They study the relationship between founding-
family firms and firm performance in the S&P 500 by using both accounting and market 
indicators to measure the firm performance. The two-way fixed effect model is used to 
control both industry and year effect for their regression model. Based on both profitability 
measures (Return on assets: ROA) and market measures (Tobin’s Q), they exhibit family 
firms perform substantially better than non-family firm in both young and old firms. Having 
concerned the management position, firm performance demonstrated more profitability when 
a family member serves as the CEO especially the founder CEO due to cumulative 
experiences in the firm. In addition, they find non-monotonic relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance; the performance first increases as the ownership increase 
and after a turning point around 30% of ownership it drops as the ownership increase. They 
conclude family firms with well-regulated and transparent market can reduce agency problem 
and are suitable for organization structure.                                                           
According to the publication of Anderson and Reeb’s paper, there are many other 
following researches showing the consistent results. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that 
family firms in Fortune 500 only create value when the founder acts as the CEO or Chairman 
with a professional CEO. They conclude that agency cost between the manager and the 
owner in the non-family firm is higher than the conflicts between family owners and minority 
shareholders in founder-CEO firms. Maury (2006) believes active family control, which has 
families held one of the top two management positions, significantly affects higher 
profitability in Western European firms. Chu (2011) also finds positively strong relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance in Taiwanese public firms when family 
members take roles in top management positions especially in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Anderson and Reeb’s conclusion are confirmed by N. Aguiló and T. 














document the supportive results from the research on UK public firms with an argument. 
They argue that the advantages of family involvement in management will continue across 
generations not only in the founder generation. 
On the contrary, Barth et al. (2005) conclude the opposite relationship in family firms. 
The firm performance in family-owned or family-managed does not outweigh the non-family 
in Norwegian firms. In addition, the professional management in family firms can only be as 
effective as in non-family firms. Another paper studies family definition by distinguishing the 
definition between “lone founder” and “family” businesses in Fortune 1000 (Miller et al., 
2007).  They define “lone founder businesses in which there are one or more founders, who 
have no relatives in the business, with family businesses in which there are multiple major 
owners or executives over time or contemporaneously from the same family.” Tobin’s Q is 
used as the market-based measurement in two-step treatment regression for the endogeneity 
control. The results show insignificant relationship between family firms and firm 
performance except in lone founder businesses. 
Since Demsetz (1983) believes ownership concentration has no systematic effect on 
firm value, he raises the issue about endogeneity. The firm profit can also influence the 
owner’s decision to hold or to sell his ownership resulting in the decision of concentrated or 
diffuse structure. It is supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) using two-stage least squares to 
treat ownership as endogenous. The results show the ownership has insignificant effects on 
the firm performance. However, La Porta et al. (1999) found the firm ownership in top 20 to 
30 of East Asian firms is quite stable over time. 
Some papers not only focus on family ownership, but they also concern about the 
voting rights’ effect on the firm value. Claessens et al. (2002) investigate listed companies in 
eight East Asian countries. The results show that cash flow rights of concentrated 
shareholders positively increase firm value measured by market-to-book ratio of assets 
whereas control rights affected by management entrenchment negatively decrease the firm 
value. The more differences between control and ownership will result to the more value 
discounts in the firm. Driffield et al. (2007) study the effect of the separation of control from 
management on firm value and capital structure in the four worst-affected countries from the 
financial crisis in East Asia consisting of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Using 
panel data with three-stage least squares (3SLS) method, the concentration in ownership can 














managements even after concerning the expropriation from minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, family firms in Thailand do not show the significant result because of the offset 
between incentives and risk-aversion effects. 
In addition, some scholars have done researches on indirect effects from family 
ownership to firm performance. Leung et al. (2014) examine the independence in board of 
directors and firm performance on firms traded on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Family firms 
tend to appoint less independent directors on the corporate board; however, the results show 
that the independence of the board in family firms does not improve the firm performance. 
Claessens et al. (1999) report that during the bad time in a financial crisis family ownership 
can help the firm to get through the financial distress and less likely to file of bankruptcy due 
to the expropriation from minority shareholders. 
1.3 The Feature of Family Business in Thailand 
Family-owned firms have widely spread out in Thai economy not only in small and 
medium-sized companies, but also in the stock exchange market. Family firms decide to 
become listed because they see the opportunities of huge funding for company’s expansion 
and also try to avoid the contradiction of later generation within the family. These family 
companies are the important mechanisms driving the financial and industrial section in 
Thailand. Focusing on the publicly-traded corporations, they are owned by few groups of 
families. The Brooker Group Pic collected Thai companies’ profiles and demonstrated 150 
influential families own most of the firms (The Brooker Group, 2001). 
Thailand is the first- affected country in 1997 Asian financial crisis and many 
economists criticize the deficiency in corporate governance as well as the family ownership 
due to the vulnerability in corporate structure. Moreover, large shareholders mostly act as 
insider management. Many family firms collapsed and disappeared from trading market after 
the crisis. Suehiro and Wailerdsak (2004) classify family businesses into 4 categories; closed 
family business, specialized family business, authoritarian family conglomerate, and modern 
family conglomerate as shown in Figure 1. After the crisis the specialized family business 
and modern family conglomerate, which has professional managers in the top positions 
whereas the control and ownership are still in the hands of family, is able to survive among 
the financial crisis. The study found 70 to 80 percent of leading family firms still exist in the 














founded in 1921 and owned by the Chearavanont family. It is the largest conglomerate in 
Thailand and is the first foreign investor in mainland China. Its core businesses are classified 
into agri-business, retailing, and telecommunications. Besides, the owner believes in non-
family management; therefore, the business group is professionally managed by experienced 
and professional executives. This is a good example to insist that family firms can be an 
efficient corporate structure rather than the failure in the organization structure. 
Figure 1 Category of family business 
 
 Source: Suehiro and Wailerdsak (2004). 
On the other hand, Claessens et al. (2000) state that “Pyramid structures are defined as 
owning a majority of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a majority of the stock 
of another, a process that can be repeated a number of times.” In addition, many Thai family 
firms have the pyramidal-holding and cross-shareholding structure which is widely criticized 
about the unbalance between ownership and control. Figure 2 represents the pyramidal 
ownership of a family business group specifically C.P. Group. It is obvious that almost all 
businesses are owned and controlled by family members. 
Bertrand et al. (2008) conclude that the larger the family members involve in the firm; 
for example, the founder has many sons take roles in different pyramid structure, the lower 
firm performance it is. The reason is common as each one wants to extract own benefits 














and firm performance is clearer when the founder is passed away. Connelly et al. (2012) 
argue that the corporate governance is positively related to the firm value measured by q 
values; however, the value is lower when the differences between ownership and control are 
higher. In addition, the good corporate governance is useless in family firms with pyramidal 
ownership structure because in practices they can override the rules using their high power 
and control. For example, they can use an informal benefit agreement between the owner and 
top management to advantage their families. In addition, Junhom (2011) could not show 
strong relationship to support his assumption that family firms have lower earnings quality 
than non-family firms in the case of Thailand.  
Figure 2 An investment map of the Charoen Pokphand Group 
 
 
Source: The Bamboo Network (Murray Weidenbaum 1998).   
1.4 Objective 
In order to study the reason for the existence and continuity of family firms in Thai 
economy, this paper will conduct an empirical study on publicly-traded corporations in the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). Using Anderson and Reeb (2003) as a based-research, 
the study examines the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. The 















 This paper intends to find answers for the following 4 research questions: 
1) Do family firms perform better than non-family firms? 
2) Do young family firms have a stronger positive impact on firm value than the old one? 
3) Does family involvement in family firms positively affect their firm performance? 
4) Is the relationship between family ownership and firm performance linear? 
The structure of this paper is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The chapter contains background and motivation of the research, review of previous 
literatures, overview of family business in Thailand, and the research objectives. 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
The chapter describes some basic concepts of family firms concerning the view of 
corporate governance and the formula used for the measurement of the firm value. 
Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 
The chapter presents the data and methodology of the empirical study. We first 
describe the definition of family firms in our sample, sample selection, data source for the 
empirical investigation. Then, we clarify the variables and methodology used in this study. 
Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
The chapter starts with the preliminary analysis from the descriptive statistics. Then, 
we discuss the results of the empirical study and perform the robustness check. 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
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